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After nearly a year in the planning, Victòria Camps confirmed in a letter to Josep
Maria Ferrater Mora on 23 April 1979 that the spanish Ministry of  Education
had decided to award him an honorary doctorate from the Autonomous University
of  Barcelona (UAB). On 21 November of  that year, he received the degree in an
investiture ceremony at which he gave an acceptance address that was later to
become famous. Because the university did not yet have an auditorium for such
events in the building that housed the rector’s office, the ceremony was held at
the UAB’s University School of  Business Studies in Sabadell. Indeed, the location
also made sense because the second individual to be honoured that day was Pau
Vila, a native son of  Sabadell. The auditorium was full to overflowing. Ferrater
expressed his delight at the honour and read a text that in reality reprised the
subject that he had addressed from Santiago de Chile thirty-five years earlierin
his volume Les formes de la vida catalana [Catalan Ways of  Life] (1944). Now he set
out his ideas of  seny, mesura and ironia (in English, good sense, measure and irony),
adding faithfulness to reality, a penchant for contracts, professionalism and the
desire for clarity.Between these two texts, he had moved through logic and analytic
philosophy in the nineteen-fifties and sixties, and this experience added nuance
to his original arguments.
His reprisal of  the subject fit well with the spirit of  the times, which had not
yet been dubbed the Transition in Spain. Rather, it involved the retrieval, renovation
and reconnection of  everything that had been lost in the tradition of philosophy
forced abroad. The address generated expectation and also, beforeh and and afterwards,
ambivalent feelings on the subject matter. Below we reproduce extracts from this
acceptance address, with special attention given to the passages that deal with the
question as they appeared in the university publication: Pau Vila i Dinarès, Josep Ferrater
i Mora (honorary doctorates): speeches delivered at the investiture ceremony, held at Sabadell on 21
November 1979 at the University School of  Business Studies.
[Pompeu Casanovas]
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Reflections on Philosophy in Catalonia (1979)
Josep Ferrater Mora
I say “philosophy in Catalonia” and not “Catalan philosophy” because my
philosophical predilections lean toward the idea that philosophy – like science –
has no nationality. Speaking of  “a Catalan philosophy” is only slightly less ab-
surd than saying “a Catalan chemistry” or a “Catalan mathematics”. I believe that
Catalans, to the extent that they do philosophy, must do so as it is (or should be)
done everywhere by everyone: without too much concern for whether it does or
does not express the national spirit. If  national spirit is problematic, create
philosophy of  a national spirit is anenormously fuzzy thing. If  it does not appear
to be so at times, this is because philosophy has been mistaken for some hazy
form of  ideology. From the time that we begin to take philosophy seriously, we
realize that adjectives are a hindrance, save for those adjectives that can clarify
the conceptual structure of  the philosophy being done. The impertinence of
extra-philosophical adjectives reveals itself  as soon as we specify a class of
philosophical problems to tackle. Take problems that are epistemological in nature.
Do we speak of  a Catalan theory of  knowledge? What would be involved in a
Catalan philosophy of linguistics or of  physics? A number of  authors think that
a universally quantified proposition does not imply the existence of what is
denoted by the variable. Others hold that a particularly quantified proposition
can be inferred from a universally quantified proposition so that the variable
linked to the former proposition will be referential. Is there a Catalan theory of
quantification? Or a Catalan theory for the reference of  linked variables? You
will say that extra-philosophical adjectives are superfluous when rather abstract
problems of  the kind mentioned here are posed, but that they are much more
appropriate when we pose questions that seem less abstract –for example,
questions about the human being, human society, human history. In these latter
cases, I do not believe that the philosophy is specifically Catalan, English or
Finnish. There is no “physical reality – mental reality” problem that is typically
Catalan. There are no Catalan concepts of  justice or equality. Catalan society, like
Catalan history and the Catalan language, may be an important piece of  empirical
data for an ethics or for a political and social philosophy; I highly doubt, though,
that this will lead us to establish the existence or the possibility of the existence
of  a Catalan ethics or a Catalan philosophy and political science.
Once we have stripped philosophy or science of  spurious adjectives, we
can acknowledge that ways of  living, acting and thinking are forged in a human
community, particularly in a national community, and that these give rise to certain
preferences. In the culture of  philosophy and science, preferences are expressed
in a variety of  ways: sometimes, it is the particularly intense cultivation of certain
disciplines; sometimes it is a tendency to adopt given procedures or methods;
Journal of Catalan Intellectual History.  Issue 5. 2013. P. 75-78
JOSEP FERRATER MORA
77
sometimes it is the most typical way of  formulating judgments, which may be
dogmatic, sceptical, measured or something else. Earlier, I expressed little
enthusiasm for the existence of a “national spirit”, perhaps because I have scant
sympathy for spirits of any kind. Therefore, the ways of  living, acting and thinking
to which I allude are not, as I understand them, manifestations of  any hypothetical
collective spirit; they are simply ways of  living, acting and thinking that appear
better suited than others to the historical conditions –the social, political and
economic conditions– in which a community develops. Evidently, as soon as
they become rather permanently established in the form of  a tradition, these
ways of  living, acting and thinking have an influence, in turn, on their historical
conditions. However, this is precisely the opposite of  a national and collective
spirit autocratically pressing down on the individuals in the community.
[...] Cum grano salis  –a tiny grain of  salt, which gives only a slight aftertaste
to food without altering its composition– we can assent to the idea that certain
communities with their own sufficiently developed cultural traditions appear to
prefer certain methods to others. In the case of philosophy, which is much less
unified than science and probably much less able to be unified as well, the
peculiarity of  the methods and procedures are quite striking. It is also revealing
because the methods and procedures used are more directly bound up with the
directions followed in the course of  research. In this sense, we can talk of a
“Catalan philosophy”, although we need to add hastily that this expression is no
more than a convenient shorthand for identifying ways of  approaching philosophy
that have generally prospered in Catalonia and in Catalan-speaking lands.
Ways of  approaching philosophy can become apparent in the form of
tendencies or attitudes. […] We now turn to a consideration of  tendencies and
attitudes in philosophy in Catalonia and in Catalan-speaking lands and introduce
them under the general form of “traits”. Understood correctly, this is not a
question of  traits common to allthinkers, but rather a collection of  various
characterizations that have what Wittgenstein called “an air of  family”. This does
not mean that each and every thinker in a given cultural community has each and
every one of these traits. But it does mean that there are traits that enable us to
move from one to another without finding ourselves, in a manner of  speaking,
“outside the case”. Obviously, there are no common traits or at least no common
philosophical tendency among Ramon Llull, Balmes, Llorens i Barba, Ramon
Turró and Joaquim Xirau [...] A quick glance at the works of  these thinkers
shows that they are very different from one another and not only because they
come from different periods in time, but also because of  their temperaments.
Nonetheless, the family resemblance appears undeniable.
For example, we do not find in Balmes or in Llorens i Barba the passionate
mysticism of  Ramon Llull, but we do find a similar confidence in the ordering
power of  human reason. We do not find in Ramon Llull the moderate scepticism
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of  Balmes or Llorens i Barba, but we do find a strong inclination to give order to
mental acts and faculties. The spiritualism of  Balmes and of  Llorens i Barba
looks nothing like the naturalism of Ramon Turró, but all three share a well-
known confidence in the cognitive possibilitiesof  experience. Joaquim Xirau would
have found little use for the positivism of  Turró, but the pair would agree on the
necessity of  avoiding speculative fantasies of  the kind to which subjective
idealismwas fondly given.
In this suggested “family” order, perhaps more significant than the
groupingof  tendencies is the grouping of  attitudes. We consider these to be
elements of  a kind of  a system within which they can be combined in various
ways and in various proportions.
What “elements” am I speaking of? I see four that appear important to
me: faithfulness to reality; a penchant for contracts, or “pactism”, which does
not reject compromise unless it involves sacrificing a value held to be essential;
professionalism; and a desire for clarity. This fourfold structure may recall the
four “Catalan ways of  life”, of  which I spoke many years ago. In effect, there are
analogies between some of  the mentioned elements and the “ways” to which I
referred. […] I will limit myself  to saying a few words regarding two of  the
elements introduced fairly surreptitiously: faithfulness to reality and a desire for
clarity.
Faithfulness to reality can be expressed in a very straightforward manner:
being faithful to reality means, first of  all, keeping your feet on the ground. It
means treading carefully. To this end, one must be, I concede, slightly distrustful
and even a little bit standoffish. Not a sceptic –which would be dogmatic from
head to toe – but rather the opposite of  reckless. [...]
The desire for clarity can be expressed in a very straightforward manner
as well: being clear means, first of  all, calling things by their name. It means not
beating around the bush, not uttering circumlocutions of  the kind beloved by
obscurantists of  all stripes. Obviously, it would be absurd to state that “clear”
and “Catalan” are the same thing. But it is curious that the common saying “clar
i català” is used to indicate clarity.
Translation from Catalan by Barnaby Noone
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